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<Abstract>
In our globalized world, courts have come to adopt roles that differ 
significantly from those typically held in the past. Some have pointed out that 
courts also create a kind of ‘network’ on the international level. The word 
‘network’ here refers to the interaction among courts inter alia mutual in 
reference to their precedents. Some call this international ‘dialogue’. However, it 
remains unclear what the role of this network of courts or international dialogue 
among courts is in our globalized legal system. Furthermore, we cannot overlook 
the fact that in the United States strong criticism has been levied against 
reference to foreign or international law and precedents in light of democracy. 
This teaches us we must take democratic legitimacy into account. For that 
reason, in this essay we examine the functions and limits of international 
dialogue among courts mainly in light of democracy. In addition, we discuss the 
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dialogue between not only domestic courts but also international courts. Prof. 
von Bogdandy insists international courts exercise a kind of public authority and 
this requires a certain democratic legitimization. We submit the importance of 
transparency, public participants and systematic interpretation of international law. 
Here we also try to justify the reference to foreign or international judgments 
by domestic courts. To that end, we introduce several ways/methods of 
justification, but find in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem the greatest potential. This 
theorem offers the possibility of both justifying and limiting the transnational 
references to judgments by not only domestic courts but also international ones.
Key Words: globalization, dialogue among courts, democracy, international 
court, legitimacy
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Over the past few decades, the interchange of human activities has 
become more and more globalized. In order to regulate activity on a 
global scale, not only states but also international organizations, informal 
intergovernmental networks, domestic administrative agencies, and even 
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private actors such as NGOs have come to play a significant role in 
setting, applying and executing legal norms. This indicates the extent to 
which globalization has also become a legal phenomenon or issue. Since 
approximately 2000, some scholars, including the prominent scholar, 
Prof. Anne-Marie Slaughter, have argued that the new legal order in the 
era of globalization is not a centralized but a disaggregated one, and is 
focused on both international formal or informal networks.1) The word 
‘network’ is not strictly defined here and includes great range of 
interactions among states, institutions and individuals, from the mere 
exchange of information to the setting rules and even executing them. 
Slaughter asserts that both international and domestic courts also form a 
kind of network.2) Some scholars, including Slaughter, have referred to 
this as a kind of international dialogue or deliberation among courts.3) 
However, in Slaughter’s entire image of the ‘new world order,’ the role 
of the courts and the inter-courts-network remains poorly defined. In 
order to bring further clarity to this point, I would like to examine the 
international dialogue among the courts, particularly in light of the 
issues of democratic legitimation. 
For this purpose, I will at first briefly discuss what the phenomenon 
of the international dialogue among the courts actually is. Second, I will 
offer a more carefully examination of international courts, addressing 
their functions and limits. Third, I will examine the functions and limits 
of domestic courts within the network of courts. Finally, I will conclude 
this essay with a short comment on the relationships between 
 1) Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 261ff. (2004).
 2) Ibid., at 65ff.
 3) See, e.g., Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization 
and the International Impact of the Renquist Court, 34 Tulsa L.J. 15, 17 (1998). 
Slaughter also cites this L’Heureux-Dubé’s paper (Slaughter, supra note 1, at 
74).
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international and domestic courts, and the normative image of 
international dialogue among courts.
Ⅱ. What is International Dialogue among Courts?
When the word ‘network’ is used in the context of globalization, 
people usually image assemblies of administrative agencies or domestic 
regulators, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.4) Is 
there any similar entity for courts? Probably the answer is no. Of 
course, previously some international conferences of judges have been 
held, and judges have had interactions among themselves.5) However, 
they do not work systematically and they have few or unclear effects 
on individual cases.6) This means that any rules directly applied in 
concrete cases are not made through such conferences and judges decide 
the case before them without input from any outside judges but based 
solely on their own assessments, unlike what occurs in the rule making 
done by networks of administrative agencies. 
Thus international dialogue or deliberation indicates, at best, mutual 
references to judgments. For a long time, courts have consulted not 
only their own precedents but also foreign judgments of similar cases to 
 4) See, e.g., P-H. Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 
Yale J. Int’l L. 113, 132-143 (2009) and also the Website of Bank of 
International Settlements, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/.
 5) Indeed, in South Africa and Brazil, worldwide conferences of constitutional 
justices have already been held. See, the website of World Conference of 
Constitutional Justice, http://www.venice.coe.int/wccj/wccj_e.asp and also 
Slaughter, supra note 1, at 96-99. 
 6) See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the 
Evolution of International Law: A Reply to Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, 
20 Euro J. Int’l L. 1021, 1024 (2009).
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their own. Even though the cross referencing of judgments is not 
completely a new phenomenon, globalization makes it more familiar. 
This grows out of the situation in which many countries face the same 
or at least similar legal issues. In addition, international courts or 
tribunals are also actors on this stage. Indeed approximately 100 years 
ago international courts were already starting to appear. But it has been 
over the past 20 years that more and more international courts or 
tribunals have been established and they have dealt with cases, which 
relate directly to individuals or domestic issues.7) Thus, nowadays what 
is at issue is a dialogue that occurs not only among domestic courts 
(reference to foreign judgments) but also among international and 
domestic courts. If we are to come to a greater understanding of this 
international dialogue that has developed among courts, it will be 
necessary to examine the functions and limits of international courts or 
tribunals, along with those of domestic courts. 
In addition, especially in the United States8), courts’ references to 
foreign or international law have been criticized in light of democracy.9) 
 7) The International Criminal Court is one of the most famous examples.
 8) Judicial dialogue (der Dialog der Gerichte / dialogue des juges) is also discussed 
in the European countries. See, Maya Hertig Randall, Der grundrechtliche Dialog 
der Gerichte in Europa (Fundamental-rights-dialogue of Courts in Europe), 41 
Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 5 (2014) [which mainly discusses 
the debate in German-speaking countries; however, footnote 10 in that work also 
cites the related French literature].
 9) The United States has a long history of referring to foreign and international law 
cases (at this point see, e.g., V.C. Jackson, Progressive Constitutionalism and 
Transnational Legal Discourse, in The Constitution in 2020 285, 286-288 (J.M. 
Balkin & R.B. Siegel eds., 2009)), in particular after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 559 (2003), in whose opinion of the Court Justice Kennedy invokes the 
so-called ‘the Wolfenden Report of England and the precedent of the European 
Court of Human Rights in the process of showing unconstitutionality of the 
same-sex sodomy prohibition’, or Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 
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And also international court’s decisions on matters that were originally a 
domestic issue or that had some impact on a domestic situation are 
problematic when we view them from a democratic standpoint. Hence 
we shall also examine the functions and limits of each type of court in 
light of democracy. 
Ⅲ. International Courts: Functions and Limits
Early in the 20th century, international adjudication was introduced as 
a means of peaceful settlement for international conflicts. The legitimacy 
of international adjudication was originally based on the consent of 
states.10) This is in principle still valid today.11) It means that individual 
consent to jurisdiction of courts for each case or ex ante categorical 
acceptance of jurisdiction is necessary when international courts settle 
disputes. As another important point is the fact that international courts 
mainly deal with conflicts between nation states, not between individuals 
or state and individual. However, in recent years, the basic image of 
whose opinion of the Court (written also by Justice Kennedy) mentions 
abolishment and prohibition of juvenile death penalty in foreign and international 
law in order to show that the death penalty for offenders under 18 is ‘unusual 
punishment’ of the 8th Amendment. However, there is tension in the U.S. 
associated with various controversies over referencing foreign or international 
law. There is also an issue over two other 8th Amendment Cases, Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which 
include references to foreign law.
10) See, Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of 
International Court’s Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 Euro 
J. Int’l L. 7, 24 (2012).
11) See, e.g., Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 
Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 107 (2009). It attaches more weight on consent by 
states. 
International ‘Dialogue’ among Courts in Light of Democracy 217
international courts has been changing. For example, not states but 
individuals are accused in the International Criminal Court. And human 
rights courts such as the European Court of Human Rights adjudge 
disputes between states and individuals.12) As these examples indicate, 
international adjudication has some direct or at least indirect effect on 
the domestic sphere. 
Prof. Armin von Bogdandy, together with Dr. Ingo Venzke, have 
argued that today international courts exercise a kind of ‘public 
authority’13) because of these functions related to international 
adjudication (though not limited to adjudication in the strictest sense).14) 
Exercising ‘public authority’ in and of itself calls for legitimation, and 
especially nowadays a democratic means of legitimation.15) 
12) For further examples, see, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the 
Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning 
Public Authority, 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 49, 57-59 (2013). 
13) The definition of ‘public authority’ by von Bogdandy is ‘the legal capacity to 
determine others and to reduce their freedom.’ See, Armin von Bogdandy, 
Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public 
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance, 9 Ger. 
L.J. 1375, 1381-1382 (2008). To the further argument over international public 
authority, see, ibid., at 1383ff.. 
14) Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 12, at 52-59, points out that the major 
functions of international courts are settling disputes (adjudication in the strictest 
sense), stabilizing normative expectations, making laws and controlling and 
legitimating (another) public authority. 
15) Of course, consent by states, the traditional source of legitimacy, is still and 
important moment for legitimation, but it is, von Bogdandy thinks, not enough. 
Furthermore, reason, which is often invoked as a moment of legitimacy in the 
domestic context (he makes a reference to Jürgen Habermas here), does not 
function here either because of the lack of a democratic parliament on the 
supranational level. See, von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 10, at 13ff.. For 
an interesting perspective on an unique form of legitimation of judicial power 
other than democratic legitimacy, see, Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches 
(2013).
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Initially von Bogdandy refers to the election of judges16) and places 
an emphasis on the importance of the independence or impartiality of 
international judges17) to secure a good judicial qualification, even 
though ‘they do not exhaust the potential of democratic legitimation that 
judicial elections contain’.18) In addition, he argues that the 
‘fragmentation of international law’ has the strong possibility of 
weakening democratic legitimacy.19) Here the ‘fragmentation of 
international law’ means the coexistence of many separated legal 
systems mainly established by the specialized international courts. Von 
Bogdandy insists that the ‘fragmentation of international law’ leads to a 
weaken democratic generality.20) This is because we can regard the law 
as democratically legitimate only when it is made through a procedure 
that is thematically unsettled and widely opened to all kinds of 
competing perspectives, according to his argument.21) 
For this reason von Bogdandy is concerned about the lack of 
democratic legitimacy and lists a number of strategies that could solve 
the problem. According to him, such procedural elements as 
transparency22) and public participation could make the exercising of 
16) Von Bogdandy & Venzke, ibid., at 32ff..
17) Interestingly enough, as we will see below, Benvenisti and Downs points out the 
relatively weak independence of international judges from related international 
organization serves as a limiting factor for international courts. See, Eyal 
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Toward Global Checks and Balance, 20 Const. 
Polit. Econ. 366, 373-374 (2009).
18) Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 10, at 34.
19) Ibid., at 23.
20) Ibid.
21) Ibid.
22) Although Prof. Grossman places little importance on the democratic legitimacy of 
international courts, he also mentions that transparency enhances democratic 
legitimacy. See, Grossman, supra note 11, at 156.
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public authority by international courts democratically legitimate.23) In 
other words, he argues that the public disclosure of procedure, the wide 
approval of the third party intervention and the use of amicus curiae 
system, could help to realize transparency and public participation. In 
this connection, von Bogdandy also refers to the impossibility of 
supranational parliamentarianism and does so by invoking Habermas.24) 
Therefore, I suppose that he mentions these procedural elements of 
international courts also as a second best strategy to legitimize law 
making on the trasnational level. 
In the end, however, he recognizes the limitations of democratic 
legitimacy with regards to international courts.25) Taking these 
limitations into consideration, domestic courts should play an important 
role in disencumbering the legitimacy problem of international courts.26) 
This is because, as he says, domestic courts or other national 
constitutional organs examine whether a decision on the international 
level fits domestic constitutional values such as democracy before 
executing the judgments issuing from international courts.27)
Finally, with regards to the fragmentation of international law and its 
related issues, von Bogdandy suggests that a systematic interpretation is 
effective for avoiding or at least easing the weakening of the 
democratic generality. A systematic interpretation means that someone 
23) Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 10, at 25ff..
24) See, ibid., at 35.
25) Ibid., at 39. 
26) Ibid., at 39. However, Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of 
Judicial Review beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards 
of Review, 10 Int’l J. Const. L. 1023, 1032 (2012) criticizes von Bogdandy for 
ignoring the extent to which there is an “allocation of decision-making authority 
between international courts …… and national governments(.)’ For more on this 
point, see, below Section V.1. 
27) Von Bogdandy & Venzke, ibid., at 39-40.
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needs to take the relevant rules of international law into account when 
he or she interprets a certain legal norm.28) In this way, we may justify 
and even normatively require mutual reference to the precedents of 
international courts.
Ⅳ. Domestic Courts: Functions and Limits of the Reference 
to Foreign or International Law
As mentioned above in the Introduction, more and more domestic 
courts cite precedents of foreign or international courts.29) Some 
28) Ibid., at 36-38.
29) For example, The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges (T. Groppi 
& M-C. Poyhoreau eds., 2014) shows the status quo. 
In Japan, the comparative perspective of law is very popular and important 
because the modern Japanese legal system was imported from western countries. 
However, relatively few Japanese scholars are interested in the issue of making 
reference to foreign or international precedence. The scholars in Japan who do 
mention this problem do so mainly when introducing the controversy in the 
United States. Additionally although the Supreme Court of Japan (SCJ) and 
lower courts seldom invoke foreign or international cases explicitly, recently SCJ 
made reference to foreign law and international human rights treaties in two 
cases (Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jun. 4, 2008, Hei 18 (Gyo Tsu) no. 135, 62 
Saiko Saibansho minji hanreishu [Minshu] 1367 (Japan) [held that a part of the 
nationality law is unconstitutional]; Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sep. 4, 2013, Hei 
24 (Ku) no. 984&985, 67 Saiko Saibansho minji hanreishu [Minshu] 1320 
(Japan) [held that the inheritance clause in civil law is unconstitutional]) and 
those references had a significant impact. For more detailed information about 
Japan in English, see, e.g., Akiko Ejima, A Gap between the Apparent and 
Hidden Attitudes of the Supreme Court of Japan towards Foreign Precedents, in 
The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges 273 (T. Groppi & M-C. 
Poyhoreau eds., 2014); Akiko Ejima, Emerging Transjudicial Dialogue on 
Human Rights in Japan, 14 Meiji L. Sch. R. 139 (2014). 
David S. Law and Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 
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proponents of such references argue that such a reference can contribute 
to the emergence of an international rule of law30) or cosmopolitan 
(value of) public law.31) Others suggest that those are very helpful to 
make a good decision because experiments in the outside of a state 
give lots of useful information that domestic courts has never taken.32) 
However, particularly in the United States33), there are not only 
proponents34) but also many opponents. They oppose references to 
Wash. L. Rev. 523, 539-540 n.61 (2011) indicates that situation in South Korea 
is very similar to that of Japan. That is to say Korean Constitutional Court 
shows reluctance to make direct reference to foreign precedents, although 
comparative law is also very popular there. According to Law and Chang, there 
are only a few cases, in which particular foreign law systems are referred. See, 
Hunbeob jaepanso [Const. Ct.], 97 Hun-Ka12, Aug. 31, 2000, (2000 DKCC, 52, 
60) (S. Kor.) [The case concerning the Nationality Act. This decision mentions 
Article 15 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(December 10, 1948) in order to clarify the concept and nature of nationality, 
and also compare nationality acquiring systems in foreign countries and that of 
Korea.]; Hunbeob jaepanso [Const. Ct.], 2002 Hun-Ka14, June 26, 2003, (2003 
DKCC, 45, 67) (S. Kor.) [The case concerning constitutionality of the Juvenile 
Sex Protection Act. It refer to the similar legislations in the United States and 
Taiwan in examining the appropriateness of the means used by the Korean Act.]; 
Hunbeob jaepanso [Const. Ct.], 2002 Hun-Ka1, Aug.26, 2004, (2004 DKCC, 11, 
43) (S. Kor.) [The case concerning conscientious objection of military service. Its 
dissenting opinion cites alternative system for military service in some foreign 
countries.].
30) Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, 
and the Evolution of International Law, 20 Euro. J. Int’l L. 59, 60 (2009).
31) L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 40. About cosmopolitan law, see, Mark D. 
Walters, The Common Law Constitution and Legal Cosmopolitanism, in The 
Unity of Public Law 431ff. (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004).
32) See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Use of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 82, 87 (2004).
33) As already mentioned in footnote 9, after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559 
(2003) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), there has been a tense 
controversy over making reference to foreign or international law. 
34) For example, Profs. Bruce Ackerman, Vicki C. Jackson, Harold H. Koh, and 
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foreign or international law because they believe such references can 
potentially damage domestic constitutional values.35) For example, Justice 
Scalia submits that the original meaning of the Constitution is changed 
by judges’ preference through citing only favorable opinions to them.36) 
Some of the opponents regard this issue as a new kind of so-called 
counter majoritarian problem of judicial review.37) I do not completely 
agree with the arguments being put forth by these opponents but I think 
this recognition is basically correct. Similar to the original counter 
majoritarian issue, I also suppose that a complete abandonment of 
referencing foreign or international law is not the right answer. 
Therefore, the question that we should answer here is how to regulate 
the referencing of international law through analyzing its functions and 
limits. In what follows, we will examine a few suggested functions and 
Slaughter are usually named as proponents in legal academic circles. Justice 
Kennedy (see, supra note 9), O’Connor (see, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 604-605), 
Breyer (see, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., concurring)), Stevens (see, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 830-831 (1988) (plurality opinion)) and Ginsburg (see, e.g., Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., 
concurring) ) out of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices are also famous 
proponents.
35) See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the 
Constitution, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 57, 58-61 (2004); Julian Ku & John Yoo, 
Taming Globalization 227ff. (2012). Out of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
Chief Justice Rehnquist (see, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-325 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ), Justice Scalia (see, below) and Thomas (see, 
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari) ) have expressed hesitancy to referencing foreign or international law.
36) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 607, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It reads: 
What these foreign sources “affirm,” rather than repudiate, is the Justices’ own 
notion of how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so 
henceforth in America.
37) See, Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 Yale L.J. 1193, 
1194-1204 (2005).
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limits of reference to foreign or international law, mainly in light of 
democracy.
1. Domestic Courts as Guardians of Democracy?
Prof. Eyal Benvensti and Prof. George W. Downs have argued that at 
a national level domestic courts can play a role as the guardians of 
democracy and other constitutional systems.38) In their minds, domestic 
courts should give deference to executives in the diplomatic area and 
more positively examine governments’ actions in the arena of foreign 
affairs. This is because, as they have explained, an increasing number 
of unilateral executive or administrative actions in such arenas damage 
the constitutional power balance between constitutional organs and lead 
to a shortage of domestic deliberation. Detailed examinations by the 
courts make governments more accountable and open trials enhance the 
transparency of government decision-making.39) With the amicus curiae 
system, Benvensti and Downs say, a kind of public participation can be 
realized.40) In addition, through the cooperation of domestic courts all 
over the world ― in other words, through the mutual exchange of 
information or dialogue ― domestic courts find good strategies to deal 
with excessive executive power.41) Furthermore, we may say that 
reference to some kinds of international law, i.e. international human 
rights treaties, protects the individual right to participate in political 
deliberation and democracy in the end.42)
38) From many, for example, Benvenisti & George W. Downs, supra note 30.
39) Ibid., at 64.
40) Ibid., at 69.
41) Ibid., at 65.
42) See, Shotaro Hamamoto, An Undemocratic Guardian of Democracy – 
International Human Rights Complaint Procedures, 38 Victoria U. Wellington L. 
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However, despite the merits of their argument, it seems to me that 
Benvensti and Downs fail to indicate exactly what kind of courts should 
aggressively apply foreign or international law. Furthermore, their 
approach contains a contradiction that is difficult to overlook; while 
they approve of courts applying or referring to foreign or international 
law, they also criticize executives for introducing international legal 
norms unilaterally.43) In order to solve these problems, it is essential 
that we understand their argument, which I explain below. Namely, on 
one hand, the courts are to positively apply the international human 
rights law that guarantees individual citizens the right to access to 
political deliberation or the democratic process. On the other hand, they 
can only refer to foreign cases when they need to know how courts in 
other countries defend the same or similar fundamental value or 
structure in their own constitutions. Through this kind of restructuring 
of Benvensti and Downs’ argument, we can begin to view it as a 
version of the process theory, which Prof. John H. Ely and his follower 
have proposed. 
Lastly I wonder why domestic courts, not international courts, are the 
guardians of democracy. Of course, a domestic court of a certain state 
is most familiar to domestic democracy or the constitutional principles 
of the state in question state. However, as to international law such as 
human rights law, I would say that, international courts do better as the 
guardian. Actually Benvensti and Downs have already answered this 
question. They argue that international courts are less independent from 
political organization than domestic courts. Therefore domestic courts are 
more suitable for fighting against political unilateralism.44) Here we can 
Rev. 199, 208-209 (2007).
43) Over more criticism, see, Ginsburg, supra note 6.
44) Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 17, at 373-380.
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find some similarities to von Bodgandy’s emphasis on the importance of 
the independence of international judges. Thus we may regard the 
danger of fragmentation as additional reason for giving domestic courts 
superiority over international courts. 
2. Attempts at Normative Authorization 
Others have attempted to normatively authorize reference to foreign or 
international law cases. In particular, these scholars have pressed for 
such efforts in human rights cases where international cases or norms 
reflect natural law or reason that is viewed as superior to democracy or 
majoritarianism.45) Prof. Jeremy Waldron suggests we can induce ius 
gentium  from the common thesis offered in courts’ decision all over the 
world.46) I think that the justification, which Waldron suggests, is one 
of the attempts to promote normative authorization.47) Indeed we cannot 
deny that, at the very least after the World War II, people have come 
to believe that some kinds of human rights have superior and universal 
value. However it seems to me that these arguments only reconfirm the 
45) To these arguments, see, e.g., Chander, supra note 37, at 1228ff..
46) Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
129 (2005).
47) On this point, while Tatsuhiko Yamamoto, Kempo Sosho ni okeru Gaikokuho 
Sansho no Saho (The Right Way to Refer to Foreign Law in Judicial Review), in 
Gendai Amerika no Shiho to Kempo (Judicial Power and Constitution in 
Contemporary America) 316, 326 (J. Kotani et al eds., 2013) regards Waldron’s 
ius gentium theory as a pragmatic one, Hajime Yamamoto, Gurobaruka Sekai to 
Jinken Hogenron no Tenkai (Globalized World and the Theory over Sources of 
Human Rights Law), in Gendai Amerika no Shiho to Kempo (Judicial Power and 
Constitution in Contemporary America) 344, 348 & 353-355 (J. Kotani et al 
eds., 2013) criticizes this view. [The original Japanese titles of papers or books 
are translated into English in this essay not by the original authors but the 
author of this paper.]
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starting point of the problem here, which is how we can make an 
arrangement for these two competing but important values―democracy 
and the rule of law (or a kind of reason). These attempts do not 
succeed in demonstrating the criteria for when and how the rules of 
law or human rights are superior to democracy. 
Nevertheless, we can also find some hints for establishing a rule. For 
example, Waldron’s ius gentium  thesis needs the accumulation of similar 
decisions.48) He does not completely consider ius gentium  of natural 
law. He indicates that ius gentium  was originally a mere expedient that 
reflects the pragmatic prudence found in many cases.49) But he does not 
indicate the detailed standard needed to refer to foreign or international 
precedents.50)
In the next section, we will examine this more detailed standard from 
various pragmatic perspectives. 
3. Pragmatic Justification
48) Waldron, supra note 46, at 133.
49) Ibid. Prof. Tatsuhiko Yamamoto places emphasis on this point. See, T. 
Yamamoto, supra note 47, at 326. On the other hand, Prof. Hajime Yamamoto 
thinks this is the only explanation of the origin of ius gentium and Waldron 
himself sees ius gentium as reflecting the universality of human rights. See, H. 
Yamamoto, supra note 47, at 348. In addition, Prof. Mark D. Walter’s definition 
that cosmopolitan law is a kind of common law, which originated from the 
Roman ius gentium, should also be introduced here. See, e.g., Walters, supra 
note 31, at 441.
50) With regards to this point, Jackson criticizes Waldron. See, Jackson, supra note 
9, at 294 n.23 [He argues a genuine and deliberated consensus is needed to 
apply Waldron’s thesis but such consensus is a relatively rare case.]. Prof. Allan 
also criticizes Waldron’s analogy in which he views reference to foreign law 
with natural science. See, James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s 
Stone, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 133, 140-141 (2008).
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At the end of the last section, I suggested the importance of 
providing a pragmatic justification for the reference to foreign or 
international law precedents. But why should we cite foreign or 
international law precedents, when many similar decisions are found in 
foreign or international courts? Prof. Eric A. Posner and Prof. Cass R. 
Sunstein give us the answer to this question.51) The Condorcet Jury 
Theorem, they submit, explains why it is significant to refer to cases 
that are outside of our own state and show us the limits of citation 
too.52) As is well known, the Jury Theorem submits that in a case in 
which every individual member of a certain group has the greatest 
possibility of making a correct decision, then the more people take part 
in the vote, the greater the possibly that the vote result will be correct, 
when these members vote independently.53) Posner and Sunstein apply 
this theorem to the cases for the following foreign or international 
decisions.
Concretely they list up three conditions for following foreign 
practices. They are: 1) ‘those practices reflect the judgment of the 
affected population or decision makers’54); 2) ‘the other state is 
sufficiently similar’55); and 3) ‘the judgment embodied in the practice of 
the other state is independent’.56) 
51) Posner and Sunstein emphasize that they, in their paper below (infra note 52), 
mean ‘to understand not only why a court might be interested in the decisions 
of other courts, but also on what assumptions that interest might be unjustified.’ 
See, Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, On learning from Others, 59 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1309, 1310 (2007).
52) Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 
131, 136-137 (2006).
53) See, e.g., Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and 
Correlated Votes, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 617, 617-618 (1992).
54) Posner & Sunstein, supra note 52, at 144.
55) Ibid.
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Let me add some additional explanations. First, the theorem assumes 
that each voter has a greater possibly of making the right decision. It 
means, in order to be counted as a voter, one must have enough and 
relevant information. This is why Posner and Sunstein enumerate 
condition 1. Second, the Jury Theorem originally deals with a case that 
focused on a certain question. Therefore other state’s decisions must 
been made under a sufficiently similar situation (condition 2). Third, 
condition 3 is clearly included in the definition of the theorem, which 
requires an independent vote. This framework of Posner and Sunstein 
successfully elucidates, I think, at most points the reasons and the 
criteria that can be followed by other states or international community, 
although it is difficult to decide whether the conditions are fulfilled or 
not.57) Posner and Sunstein actually cast doubt on the judicial 
competence needed to judge the fulfillment of these conditions in 
concrete cases.58) This demonstrates that when we evaluate the courts’ 
reference to foreign or international cases, we have to take the capacity 
56) Ibid., at 144-145.
57) In my original report in National Taiwan University, on which this paper is 
based, Prof. Ginsburg pointed out the difficulty associated with inquiring into the 
similarity and independency at the same time. I suppose the word ‘similarity’ 
means that the situation in question is not far from that of the referred case, 
while ‘independency’ eliminates mimicry or obedience to the other judgments. 
Thus these requests, I think, could be fulfilled simultaneously, even though the 
associated difficulty is not completely erased.
Furthermore Prof. Rosenkranz, in Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the 
Constitution: A Response to The Law of Other States, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1281 
(2007), makes a little more fundamental criticism of the Posner and Sunstein’s 
arguments. In summary, he submits that Condorcet Jury Theorem is based on the 
assumption that the right answer does exist, while the Founding Fathers deny 
such an idea. This criticism seems to be no more than an originalist view. 
Posner and Sunstein also replied to Rosenkranz in Posner & Sunstein, supra note 
51, at 1310ff.. 
58) Posner & Sunstein, supra note 52, at 168-172.
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of courts into consideration. 
Another point that I shall mention is they distinctly separate foreign 
law and international law59), even though others often mix them.60) 
They devote most of their thesis to questions about following foreign 
practices and only a few comments on international law. These two 
professors advocate that ‘a domestic court should not place any weight 
on international treaties, except as the equivalent of “vote” by each of 
the parties’.61) However, I think this does not deny the utility of three 
conditions as criteria. In other words, this criteria is, I think, to be said 
the universal one. Thus it justifies reference to not only human rights 
law but also all kinds of law. 
Lastly here, I would like to call attention to von Bogdandy’s 
argument that international courts should take the systematic way of 
interpretation to avoid the fragmentation of international law and damage 
on democratic generality.62) Although he does not talk a lot about 
precise ways or criteria of systematic interpretation, I think the Jury 
Theorem also works here as such criteria.63) 
59) Ibid., at 164-168.
60) Arguments that invoke Cosmopolitan law or ius gentium have the possibility of 
relativizing the distinction between foreign and international law.
61) Posner & Sunstein, supra note 52, at 166. Indeed this point is very important, 
but we should not overlook the fact that international law, especially the 
international human rights treaties in question, here also have the status of valid 
domestic law in many countries, while foreign law has no validity as law 
outside its own country.
62) Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 10, at 36-38.
63) However, in the international context, we might have to be careful of cultural 
pluralism.
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Ⅴ. Conclusion
In Section III and IV, we offered a brief analyze of the functions 
and limits of international and domestic courts. Here I will conclude 
this essay with consideration to the relationship between international 
courts and domestic courts (1.). Then I will reconfirm what the 
international dialogue among courts is and should be (2.).
1. Relationship between International Courts and Domestic Courts
We have already reviewed some ideas regarding the relationship 
between international courts and domestic courts. For example, von 
Bogdandy suggests execution of the decision of an international court 
would need supplementary arrangements by domestic courts.64) In 
relation to this, some argue that international (or higher level) courts 
should defer to domestic (or lower level) courts in a case when a 
domestic matter is at issue (the principle of subsidiarity).65) This is 
because, von Staden submits, international courts are far removed from 
individuals, therefore national decision-makers are better at deciding 
what is suitable for domestic situations.66)
Though not discussed previously in this article, Benvensti and Downs 
submit that domestic courts should cooperate with each other in order 
to apply pressure on international courts to reconsider their own 
decisions.67) Moreover, on one hand, while Posner and Sunstein do not 
completely deny the possibility that domestic courts could cite 
64) Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 10, at 39. See, also, Benvenisti & Downs, 
supra note 17, at 380.
65) See, e.g., von Staden, supra note 26, at 1026.
66) See, ibid., at 1034-1038.
67) See, Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 6, at 68.
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international precedents, on the other hand, von Bogdandy’s systematic 
interpretation principle does not exclude international court’s reference to 
relevant domestic cases.
These arguments demonstrate the importance and utility of mutual 
checking between international and domestic courts. 
2. Reconfirm: What is international dialogue among courts?
Here, I would like to summarize the argument above. First, 
international dialogue among courts means the interaction of courts or 
horizontal and vertical reference among courts. Second, democratic 
legitimacy based on the general public must be taken into account when 
we evaluate the dialogue. Third, with an understanding and respecting 
mutual independency and originality, courts should check each other 
through cross-referencing. In particular, subsidiarity is needed in vertical 
interactions. Finally courts shall decide whether a certain precedent is 
followed under the three conditions lead from the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem.  
Lastly I would like to mention one more point. Interestingly Slaughter 
asserts that in an era of disaggregated sovereignty like what we are 
experiencing today, five norms must be observed if we are to build a 
just world order: deliberative equality, legitimate difference, positive 
comity, check and balance, and finally subsidiarity.68) When comparing 
these with the discussion above, you would find some accordance 
between them. This seems to demonstrate that Slaughter’s normative 
evaluation of ‘network’ also basically applies to the international 
interaction of courts or international ‘dialogue’ among courts.
68) Slaughter, supra note 1, at 244ff..
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<국문초록>
민주주의의 관점에서 법원간의 국제적 ‘대화’
야마다 사토시*
69)
세계화 시대에, 법원은 과거에 가졌던 역할과는 상당히 다른 역할을 채
택하고 있다. 몇몇 사람들은 법원이 또한 국제 수준에서 일종의 ‘네트워크’
를 형성한다고 지적했다. 여기에서 ‘네트워크’라는 단어는 법원간의 상호작
용, 그 중에서도 선례를 따르는 상호작용을 의미한다. 이들은 이를 국제적 
‘대화’라고 부른다. 그러나, 세계화된 법률시스템 내에서 법원의 이러한 상
호작용의 역할이 무엇인지가 불확실한 상태로 남아있다. 게다가, 우리는 
미국에서 외국 또는 국제적인 법과 선례의 참조를 민주주의의 관점에서 
강하게 비판해왔다는 사실을 간과할 수 없다. 이것은 우리가 반드시 민주
적 정당성을 고려해야 함을 알려주는 것이다. 이러한 이유로, 본 논문에서
는 주로 민주주의의 관점에서 법원간의 국제적 대화의 기능과 한계를 검
토한다. 그리고 국내의 법원뿐만 아니라 국제적인 법원 사이의 대화에 대
해 논해본다. Von Bogdandy교수는 국제법원이 공권력을 발휘하는 데에는, 
특별한 민주적 합법화가 요구된다고 주장한다. 이는 투명성, 공중참여, 국
제법의 체계적 해석의 중요성을 제기한다. 또한 본 논문에서는 국내법원의 
외국 또는 국제 판결의 참조를 정당화시키고자 한다. 이를 위해, 정당화를 
위한 몇 가지 방법을 소개하면서, 그 중에서 Condorcet’s Jury Theorem가 
가장 적합함을 밝히고 있다. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem는 국내법원과 국
제법원의 판결에 초국가적인 참고를 정당화하는 것과 제한하는 것 모두를 
가능하게 하기 때문이다. 
주제어: 세계화, 법원간의 대담, 민주주의, 국제사법재판소, 정당성
 * 오카야마대학 인문사회문화과학대학 법학부 조교수.
